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  In	  recent	  decades	  there	  has	  been	  a	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  self-­‐knowledge	  among	  philosophers	  of	  a	  broadly	  ‘analytic’	  orientation.	  This	  interest	  was	  driven	  at	  first	  by	  questions	  about	  whether	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  contents	  of	  one’s	  mental	  states	  was	  compatible	  with	  ‘externalist’	  views	  of	  mental	  content,	  and	  later	  by	  a	  number	  of	  influential	  books	  and	  papers	  offering	  more	  systematic	  accounts	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  in	  general,	  chief	  among	  these	  the	  works	  brought	  together	  in	  Richard	  Moran’s	  Authority	  
and	  Estrangement.	  Moran	  tries	  in	  that	  book	  to	  reorient	  the	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  away	  from	  narrowly	  epistemological	  concerns	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  privileged	  access,	  arguing	  that	  self-­‐knowledge	  should	  also	  be	  a	  main	  concern	  of	  philosophical	  moral	  psychology,	  and	  that	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  will	  be	  incomplete	  as	  long	  as	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  place	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  in	  a	  person’s	  social	  and	  psychological	  well-­‐being.	  An	  important	  theme	  in	  Moran’s	  book	  is	  that	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘fundamental	  asymmetries’	  between	  first-­‐	  and	  third-­‐personal	  perspectives	  on	  a	  person’s	  thoughts,	  attitudes,	  actions,	  feelings,	  etc.	  –	  for	  example,	  the	  way	  that	  a	  person	  usually	  knows	  ‘without	  observation’	  what	  she	  believes	  or	  is	  intentionally	  doing,	  that	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  thoughts	  and	  actions	  is	  usually	  somehow	  authoritative,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  are	  neither	  exceptionless	  and	  neatly	  definable	  nor	  always	  a	  ground	  of	  first-­‐personal	  privilege.	  That	  is,	  Moran’s	  position	  is	  meant	  not	  just	  to	  allow	  for,	  but	  also	  to	  explain	  the	  inevitability	  of,	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  person	  may	  need	  such	  things	  as	  observation,	  inference,	  or	  the	  testimony	  of	  others	  to	  know	  her	  true	  thoughts	  or	  feelings,	  and	  also	  to	  explore	  why	  there	  are	  some	  things	  a	  person	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  better	  about	  others	  than	  she	  does	  about	  herself,	  so	  that	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  these	  sorts	  tend	  to	  be	  outright	  disprivileged	  in	  contrast	  to	  their	  third-­‐personal	  counterparts.	  	   The	  works	  under	  review,	  both	  of	  which	  aim	  to	  deconstruct	  excessive	  and	  unrealistic	  philosophical	  conceptions	  of	  first-­‐personal	  privilege	  and	  replace	  these	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  frequent	  opacity	  of	  one’s	  own	  psychology,	  both	  overlook	  or	  ignore	  the	  similar	  themes	  in	  Moran’s	  work,	  despite	  identifying	  that	  work	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  view	  of	  first-­‐personal	  authority	  they	  wish	  to	  critique.	  Though	  both	  authors	  prefer	  to	  address	  themselves	  to	  ‘families’	  of	  views	  or	  general	  ‘tendencies’	  in	  philosophical	  work	  rather	  than	  engaging	  the	  details	  of	  how	  various	  philosophers	  have	  developed	  these	  ideas,	  in	  Quassim	  Cassam’s	  book	  the	  identification	  of	  Moran	  as	  a	  target	  is	  quite	  explicit:	  Moran	  is	  the	  chief	  representative	  of	  what	  Cassam	  calls	  ‘Rationalist’	  conceptions	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  which,	  Cassam	  claims,	  have	  distorted	  its	  nature	  by	  overstating	  the	  privilege	  of	  our	  
self-­‐knowledge	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  understanding	  its	  real	  psychological	  significance.	  If	  this	  account	  were	  correct,	  then	  Moran’s	  project	  would	  be	  a	  failure	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  	   In	  fact,	  the	  construal	  of	  Moran	  as	  a	  pure	  ‘Rationalist’,	  like	  Cassam’s	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  ‘Rationalist’	  approach	  in	  general,	  is	  an	  inaccurate	  caricature.	  Cassam’s	  ‘Rationalist’	  tries	  to	  account	  for	  self-­‐knowledge	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  average	  human	  being	  is	  of	  the	  species	  homo	  philosophicus,	  a	  ‘model	  epistemic	  citizen’	  who	  can	  know	  her	  own	  beliefs	  because	  the	  following	  two	  conditions	  are	  satisfied	  in	  her	  case	  (see	  SKH,	  p.	  4):	  	  (i)	  What	  HP	  believes	  is	  what	  she	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe,	  what	  she	  wants	  is	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  want,	  what	  she	  fears	  is	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  fear,	  and	  so	  on.	  (ii)	  HP	  knows	  or	  justifiably	  believes	  that	  what	  she	  wants	  is	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  want,	  what	  she	  fears	  is	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  fear,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  ‘Rationalist’	  makes	  these	  assumptions	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  transparency	  of	  self-­‐knowledge,	  or	  how	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  so	  on	  is	  made	  not	  on	  introspective	  grounds,	  but	  rather	  by	  considering	  the	  ‘external’	  facts	  in	  reference	  to	  which	  these	  attitudes	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  rationalized.	  Given	  (i)	  and	  (ii),	  homo	  
philosophicus	  could	  come	  to	  know	  what	  she	  believes	  by	  determining	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  believe,	  as	  Gareth	  Evans	  suggests	  in	  a	  memorable	  passage	  from	  
The	  Varieties	  of	  Reference:	  	  
If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be a third world war?”, I must attend in 
answering him to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering 
the question “Will there be a third world war?” I get myself into a position to answer the question 
whether I believe that P by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the 
question whether P …1 	  For	  the	  ‘Rationalist’,	  answering	  Evans’s	  outwardly	  directed	  question	  is	  a	  way	  for	  a	  person	  to	  determine	  what	  she	  rationally	  ought	  to	  believe.	  Knowing	  this,	  and	  given	  the	  assumptions	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  above,	  homo	  philosophicus	  can	  know	  her	  beliefs	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  way	  that	  Evans	  describes.	  	   Of	  course,	  human	  beings	  are	  not	  homines	  philosophici,	  and	  so	  ‘Rationalism’	  thus	  construed	  is	  hopeless	  as	  an	  account	  of	  human	  self-­‐knowledge.	  Cassam	  documents	  our	  irrationality	  extensively	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  experimental	  literature	  on	  heuristics	  and	  biases,	  but	  that	  humans	  have	  –	  to	  put	  it	  mildly	  –	  a	  tendency	  to	  reason	  badly	  is	  not	  a	  fact	  that	  we	  needed	  laboratories	  to	  discover.	  What	  would	  be	  surprising	  would	  be	  if	  careful	  philosophers	  had	  built	  their	  theories	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  humans’	  beliefs,	  desires,	  fears,	  etc.	  are	  always	  or	  even	  generally	  guided	  by	  reason.	  And	  Moran,	  in	  any	  case,	  makes	  no	  such	  assumption.	  Rather,	  the	  most	  Moran	  assumes	  is	  that	  many	  of	  a	  person’s	  attitudes	  will	  conform	  to	  what	  she	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  them	  –	  an	  assumption	  that	  may	  be	  false,	  but	  isn’t	  challenged	  at	  all	  by	  showing	  that	  we	  often	  believe	  things	  for	  bad	  reasons,	  as	  long	  as	  in	  those	  cases	  we	  mistake	  those	  bad	  reasons	  for	  good	  ones.	  Based	  as	  it	  is	  in	  this	  inaccurate	  account	  of	  Moran’s	  position,	  Cassam’s	  main	  argument	  against	  it	  fails.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  G.	  Evans,	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Reference	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1982),	  at	  p.	  225.	  
	   What	  is	  more	  valuable	  in	  Cassam’s	  book	  than	  this	  misplaced	  critique	  of	  Moran’s	  supposed	  ‘Rationalism’	  is	  his	  invitation	  to	  emphasize	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘substantial’	  self-­‐knowledge	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  ‘trivial’	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  he	  thinks	  philosophers	  have	  recently	  been	  too	  focused	  on.	  ‘Trivial’	  and	  ‘substantial’	  here	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  moral	  weight	  or	  personal	  importance	  of	  the	  attitudes	  a	  person	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  knowledge	  of:	  an	  example	  of	  the	  former	  would	  be	  the	  knowledge	  that	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  raining,	  or	  want	  to	  have	  pizza	  for	  lunch;	  of	  the	  latter,	  the	  knowledge	  that	  I	  am	  happy	  in	  my	  marriage,	  or	  harbor	  racist	  or	  sexist	  attitudes	  that	  I	  would	  explicitly	  disavow.	  Cassam	  argues,	  and	  here	  he	  is	  correct,	  that	  much	  of	  our	  substantial	  self-­‐knowledge	  can’t	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  way	  suggested	  in	  the	  quote	  above	  from	  Evans.	  For	  a	  person	  to	  determine	  e.g.	  how	  satisfied	  she	  is	  with	  her	  career	  she	  must	  do	  more	  than	  just	  consider	  whether	  that	  career	  is	  satisfying,	  since	  she	  might	  judge	  that	  her	  career	  is	  satisfying	  when	  she	  reflects	  on	  it	  in	  this	  explicit	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  way	  while	  remaining	  dissatisfied	  in	  a	  way	  that	  doesn’t	  reflect	  her	  deliberate	  assessment.	  	   So	  Cassam	  is	  right	  that	  a	  philosophical	  account	  of	  substantial	  self-­‐knowledge	  cannot	  assume	  that	  our	  attitudes	  are	  perfectly	  responsive	  even	  to	  our	  (frequently	  mistaken)	  assessments	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  them:	  knowing	  these	  important	  truths	  about	  our	  ‘real	  selves’	  requires	  something	  more	  than	  our	  ordinary	  capacities	  for	  self-­‐conscious	  reasoning.	  This	  again	  is	  not	  much	  of	  a	  strike	  against	  Moran,	  however,	  since	  as	  noted	  above	  he	  positively	  emphasizes	  those	  cases	  where	  a	  person’s	  mind	  is	  ‘opaque’	  to	  her	  in	  just	  these	  ways;	  e.g.:	  	  The	  person	  who	  feels	  anger	  at	  the	  dead	  parent	  for	  abandoning	  her,	  or	  who	  feels	  betrayed	  or	  deprived	  of	  something	  by	  another	  child,	  may	  only	  know	  of	  this	  attitude	  through	  the	  eliciting	  or	  interpreting	  of	  evidence	  of	  various	  kinds.	  She	  might	  become	  thoroughly	  convinced,	  both	  from	  the	  constructions	  of	  the	  analyst,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  her	  own	  appreciation	  of	  the	  evidence,	  that	  this	  attitude	  must	  indeed	  be	  attributed	  to	  her.	  And	  yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  she	  reflects	  on	  the	  world-­‐directed	  question	  itself,	  whether	  she	  has	  indeed	  been	  betrayed	  by	  this	  person,	  she	  may	  find	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  no	  or	  can’t	  be	  settled	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other.	  So,	  transparency	  fails	  because	  she	  cannot	  learn	  of	  this	  attitude	  of	  hers	  by	  reflection	  on	  the	  object	  of	  that	  attitude.	  She	  can	  only	  learn	  of	  it	  in	  a	  fully	  theoretical	  manner,	  taking	  an	  empirical	  stance	  toward	  herself	  as	  a	  particular	  psychological	  subject.2	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  passages	  like	  this	  one,	  Moran’s	  extended	  discussion	  in	  Authority	  
and	  Estrangement	  of	  the	  ‘trivial’	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  e.g.	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  raining	  is	  intended	  not	  as	  an	  account	  of	  what	  human	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  like	  all	  the	  time	  or	  even	  in	  general,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  a	  certain	  paradigmatic	  form	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  self-­‐conscious	  reflection	  rather	  than	  introspection,	  inference,	  self-­‐observation,	  or	  the	  advice	  of	  an	  analyst.	  This	  knowledge	  is	  trivial	  but	  the	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  it	  is	  not,	  any	  more	  than	  the	  philosophy	  of	  perception	  is	  ‘trivial’	  when	  it	  tries	  to	  explain	  how	  a	  person	  can	  know	  by	  sight	  that	  a	  nearby	  object	  in	  good	  lighting	  is	  a	  tea-­‐cup,	  even	  as	  there	  are	  so	  many	  more	  important	  matters	  that	  perception	  cannot	  so	  easily	  reveal.	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  R.	  Moran,	  Authority	  and	  Estrangement:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Self-­‐Knowledge	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  at	  p.	  85.	  
	   The	  fact	  (if	  it	  is	  a	  fact)	  that	  transparent	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  paradigmatic,	  and	  perhaps	  also	  fundamental	  in	  being	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  without	  which	  a	  person	  might	  not	  count	  as	  a	  rational	  agent,	  and	  without	  which	  other	  forms	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  might	  not	  be	  possible	  at	  all,	  of	  course	  does	  not	  show	  that	  those	  other	  forms	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  do	  not	  deserve	  serious	  philosophical	  consideration.	  And	  so	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  criticize	  philosophers	  for	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  explaining	  transparency	  and	  not	  enough	  on	  understanding	  cases	  that	  are	  not	  so	  paradigmatic,	  but	  are	  nevertheless	  of	  immense	  personal	  and	  philosophical	  importance.	  The	  best	  thing	  about	  Cassam’s	  book	  is	  the	  invitation	  it	  offers	  to	  consider	  those	  cases	  more	  fully,	  and	  to	  see	  them	  as	  no	  less	  important	  to	  an	  account	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  than	  the	  cases	  where	  such	  knowledge	  is	  easier	  to	  come	  by.	  The	  shame	  is	  that	  he	  so	  grossly	  misrepresents	  the	  position	  he	  is	  using	  as	  a	  foil.	  	   John	  Doris’s	  target	  in	  Talking	  to	  Our	  Selves	  is	  not	  rationalism	  but	  a	  position	  he	  calls	  reflectivism,	  according	  to	  which	  it	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  morally	  responsible	  agency	  that	  a	  person	  have	  self-­‐knowledge	  of	  her	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  Doris’s	  reflectivism	  is,	  once	  again,	  not	  a	  doctrine	  that	  is	  held	  in	  all	  its	  details	  by	  any	  particular	  philosopher,	  but	  unlike	  Cassam	  Doris	  outlines	  a	  view	  that	  corresponds	  to	  some	  real	  tendencies	  in	  serious	  philosophical	  thought.	  Still,	  according	  to	  Doris	  the	  ‘traditional	  conceptions	  of	  practical	  rationality’	  that	  assume	  reflectivism	  are	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  ways	  human	  beings	  actually	  order	  our	  lives,	  guided	  as	  we	  often	  are	  by	  ‘an	  unconscious	  at	  odds	  with	  deliberate	  intention’	  (TOS,	  pp.	  16,	  5).	  Doris	  argues	  that	  the	  reflectivist	  will	  have	  to	  regard	  unconsciously	  motivated	  behaviors	  as	  non-­‐agential,	  and	  thus	  that	  reflectivism	  leads	  to	  skepticism	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  responsible	  agency.	  The	  solution,	  he	  claims,	  lies	  in	  a	  nonreflectivist	  position	  on	  which	  ‘the	  expression	  of	  values	  associated	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  agency	  need	  not	  be	  a	  reflective	  process’	  (TOS,	  p.	  33)	  –	  a	  position	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  his	  book.	  	   My	  focus	  here	  will	  be	  on	  the	  negative	  part	  of	  Doris’s	  argument.	  (I	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  reflectivist	  cannot	  take	  on	  board	  many	  of	  Doris’s	  nonreflectivist	  ideas,	  though	  as	  a	  supplement	  to	  a	  sensible	  reflectivism	  rather	  than	  an	  outright	  replacement	  for	  it.)	  The	  strategy	  there	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  prevalence	  of	  what	  Doris	  calls	  self-­‐ignorance,	  then	  argue	  that	  any	  view	  on	  which	  ‘the	  exercise	  of	  human	  agency	  requires	  accurate	  reflection’	  (TOS,	  p.	  19)	  –	  requires,	  that	  is,	  an	  accurate	  self-­‐knowledge	  of	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  or	  of	  the	  values	  that	  an	  action	  expresses	  –	  will	  treat	  self-­‐ignorance	  as	  undermining	  agency.	  According	  to	  Doris,	  to	  avoid	  the	  skeptical	  threat	  that	  emerges	  when	  we	  take	  self-­‐ignorance	  seriously,	  we	  must	  reject	  those	  reflectivist	  theories	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  nonreflectivist	  alternative.	  	   How,	  though,	  is	  this	  skeptical	  threat	  supposed	  to	  arise?	  Doris	  claims	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  widespread	  self-­‐ignorance	  is	  supported	  by	  studies	  in	  experimental	  social	  psychology	  that	  reveal	  ‘influences	  on	  behavior	  that	  are	  both	  unconscious	  and	  unexpected	  …	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  practical	  reasoning’	  (TOS,	  p.	  43).	  These	  influences,	  he	  claims,	  are	  ‘causes	  of	  behavior	  that	  are	  not	  plausibly	  taken	  as	  reasons	  for	  behavior’,	  since	  a	  person	  would	  not	  ‘be	  willing	  to	  treat	  [such	  a]	  consideration	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  their	  judgment	  or	  behavior’	  (ibid.).	  Moreover,	  many	  cases	  of	  self-­‐ignorance	  are	  practically	  relevant,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  were	  a	  person	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  such	  an	  unconscious	  influence	  ‘she	  would	  behave	  –	  or	  argue,	  judge,	  feel,	  etc.	  –	  
differently’	  than	  she	  will	  when	  she	  is	  unaware	  of	  the	  influence	  (TOS,	  p.	  21).	  The	  self-­‐ignorant	  agent	  is	  not	  self-­‐directed	  in	  the	  way	  the	  reflectivist	  supposes	  that	  agency	  requires:	  her	  thinking	  and	  behavior	  are	  controlled	  instead	  by	  things	  outside	  her	  ken.	  	   Spelled	  out	  in	  more	  detail,	  Doris’s	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  reflectivist	  should	  be	  troubled	  by	  cases	  where	  the	  outputs	  of	  unconscious	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  
incongruent	  with	  those	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  reasoning,	  and	  where	  these	  unconscious	  outputs	  bypass	  deliberation	  so	  that	  ‘behavior	  is	  influenced	  by	  a	  process	  that	  the	  actor	  is	  unaware	  of,	  and	  would	  not	  recognize	  as	  a	  reason	  justifying	  the	  behavior,	  were	  she	  so	  aware’	  (TOS,	  p.	  51).	  According	  to	  Doris,	  the	  reflectivist	  must	  treat	  such	  a	  case	  of	  ignorance	  with	  bypassing	  as	  a	  defeater	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  agency,	  since	  ‘the	  causes	  of	  [the	  actor’s]	  cognition	  or	  behavior	  would	  not	  be	  recognized	  by	  the	  actor	  as	  reasons	  for	  that	  cognition	  or	  behavior,	  were	  she	  aware	  of	  those	  causes	  at	  the	  time	  of	  performance’,	  and	  so	  the	  reflectivist	  will	  hold	  that	  ‘the	  exercise	  of	  agency	  does	  not	  obtain’	  in	  such	  a	  case.	  More	  generally:	  ‘If	  the	  presence	  of	  defeaters	  cannot	  be	  confidently	  ruled	  out	  for	  a	  particular	  behavior,	  it	  is	  not	  justified	  to	  attribute	  to	  the	  actor	  an	  exercise	  of	  agency.	  If	  there	  is	  general	  difficulty	  in	  ruling	  out	  defeaters,	  skepticism	  about	  agency	  ensues’	  (TOS,	  pp.	  64-­‐65).	  	   Whether	  the	  reflectivist	  must	  regard	  self-­‐ignorance	  as	  incompatible	  with	  agency	  will	  depend,	  however,	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  that	  ignorance,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  accuracy	  in	  reflective	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  the	  reflectivist	  takes	  agency	  to	  require.	  For	  example:	  in	  the	  Stroop	  task,	  a	  subject’s	  report	  of	  certain	  features	  of	  a	  perceptual	  stimulus,	  such	  as	  its	  color,	  will	  be	  influenced	  by	  task-­‐irrelevant	  features	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  such	  as	  which	  word	  it	  is	  –	  a	  subject	  will	  e.g.	  report	  the	  red	  color	  of	  the	  word	  ‘red’	  more	  quickly	  than	  the	  red	  color	  of	  the	  word	  ‘blue’.	  We	  might	  note	  further	  that	  this	  ignorance	  can	  be	  practically	  relevant,	  say	  if	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  have	  one’s	  response	  time	  be	  determined	  just	  by	  the	  actual	  color	  of	  the	  stimulus:	  in	  such	  a	  situation,	  a	  subject	  who	  knew	  of	  the	  unconscious	  influences	  would	  adopt	  a	  different	  strategy,	  e.g.	  of	  deliberately	  ignoring	  task-­‐irrelevant	  features.	  But	  the	  reflectivist	  should	  not	  therefore	  think	  that	  the	  self-­‐ignorant	  subject’s	  response	  is	  not	  an	  instance	  of	  agency,	  or	  even	  that	  the	  subject’s	  agency	  is	  significantly	  compromised,	  unless	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  task-­‐irrelevant	  feature	  is	  quite	  large.	  How	  large?	  That	  depends,	  again,	  on	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  reflectivist	  position	  in	  question.	  But	  the	  point	  is	  that	  not	  just	  any	  unconscious	  influence	  will	  be	  enough	  to	  threaten	  agency,	  even	  according	  to	  a	  rather	  austere	  reflectivism.	  Nor	  will	  identifying	  just	  a	  few	  agency-­‐undermining	  influences	  be	  enough	  to	  support	  a	  skeptical	  threat	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  agency	  in	  general,	  which	  according	  to	  Doris	  is	  supposed	  to	  happen	  here.	  	   As	  another	  illustration	  of	  this	  point,	  consider	  the	  findings	  Doris	  discusses	  about	  how	  intuitively	  irrelevant	  factors	  like	  a	  person’s	  name	  can	  influence	  their	  life	  choices,	  e.g.	  of	  a	  career	  or	  a	  place	  to	  move	  to	  (see	  TOS,	  pp.	  54-­‐56	  and	  71-­‐73).	  Supposing	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  the	  relevant	  influences	  are	  unconscious,	  and	  also	  that	  they	  work	  contrary	  to	  explicit	  deliberative	  processes	  rather	  than	  complementing	  them	  by,	  say,	  helping	  to	  break	  ‘ties’	  or	  making	  certain	  possibilities	  more	  salient,	  then	  these	  will	  be	  cases	  of	  incongruence	  with	  bypassing.	  But	  whether	  a	  reflectivist	  should	  count	  these	  as	  defeaters	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  deliberative	  agency,	  as	  opposed	  to	  influences	  that	  make	  an	  agent	  somewhat	  irrational	  or	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  agency	  without	  altogether	  eliminating	  it,	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  
person’s	  choices	  are	  driven	  by	  unconscious	  influences	  rather	  than	  self-­‐conscious	  thought.	  And	  in	  the	  cases	  at	  issue,	  the	  causal	  role	  assigned	  to	  unconscious	  factors	  in	  determining	  a	  person’s	  choices	  is	  very	  small:	  Doris	  cites	  a	  finding	  that	  women	  were	  18%	  more	  likely	  than	  they	  would	  be	  by	  chance	  to	  move	  to	  states	  with	  names	  resembling	  their	  first	  names,	  and	  36%	  more	  likely	  for	  states	  that	  were	  perfect	  matches;3	  but	  still	  it	  appears	  that	  about	  94%	  of	  the	  women	  in	  that	  study’s	  dataset	  moved	  where	  they	  did	  for	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  the	  ‘name	  effect’.4	  (Note	  that	  this	  dataset	  included	  only	  women	  named	  Florence,	  Georgia,	  Louise,	  or	  Virginia	  who	  moved	  to	  Florida,	  Georgia,	  Louisiana,	  or	  Virginia.	  That	  last	  percentage	  would	  have	  been	  even	  higher	  if	  it	  also	  concerned	  women	  with	  those	  names	  who	  moved	  to	  states	  other	  than	  these	  four.)	  As	  long	  as	  a	  lot	  of	  that	  other	  variance	  in	  these	  choices	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  conscious	  reasoning,	  the	  reflectivist	  should	  not	  be	  troubled	  by	  these	  results.	  	   Doris	  is	  aware	  of	  this	  difficulty.	  He	  does	  not,	  however,	  address	  it	  head-­‐on	  by	  detailing	  any	  wide	  range	  of	  actual	  cases	  where	  unconscious	  influences	  do	  defeat	  agency	  totally	  rather	  than	  just	  partially	  –	  that	  is,	  cases	  where	  the	  reflectivist	  should	  accept	  that	  agency	  is	  altogether	  ‘swamped’	  (see	  TOS,	  p.	  68),	  and	  not	  just	  subject	  to	  some	  extra-­‐agential	  influences	  that	  work	  against	  the	  agent’s	  self-­‐conscious	  thought.	  Instead,	  Doris	  argues	  that	  for	  all	  we	  know	  there	  could	  be	  cases	  like	  that,	  where	  the	  unconscious	  and	  incongruent	  factors	  that	  bypass	  conscious	  deliberation	  also	  overrule	  its	  force,	  and	  that	  the	  burden	  is	  on	  the	  reflectivist	  to	  rule	  this	  possibility	  out.	  Thus	  he	  writes	  that	  his	  skeptic	  about	  agency	  ‘needn’t	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  partial	  defeaters	  having	  only	  limited	  impact	  on	  agency,	  she	  need	  only	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  difficulty	  of	  establishing,	  in	  any	  particular	  case,	  that	  it	  is	  only	  such	  comparatively	  benign	  influences	  which	  obtain’	  (ibid.).	  And	  again,	  now	  in	  more	  detail	  (I	  have	  added	  the	  bracketed	  numbers	  for	  ease	  of	  reference):	  	  Once	  we	  see	  that	  [1]	  there	  are	  some	  arbitrary	  influences	  on	  cognition	  and	  behavior,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  admit	  that	  [2]	  there	  may	  be	  others;	  if	  something	  like	  that	  can	  make	  a	  difference,	  there	  could	  be	  many	  goofy	  influences	  in	  any	  particular	  instance.	  While	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  goofy	  influence	  may	  be	  statistically	  small,	  just	  as	  with	  medical	  interventions,	  [3]	  the	  aggregate	  effect	  may	  be	  quite	  potent;	  for	  all	  one	  knows,	  any	  decision	  may	  be	  infested	  by	  any	  number	  of	  rationally	  and	  ethically	  arbitrary	  influences.	  (TOS,	  p.	  64)	  	  This	  skeptical	  argument	  has	  some	  questionable	  company.	  Consider:	  Once	  we	  see	  that	  [1’]	  there	  are	  some	  cases	  where	  sensory	  perception	  is	  inaccurate,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  admit	  that	  [2’]	  there	  may	  be	  others;	  if	  the	  senses	  can	  mislead	  us	  in	  a	  case	  like	  that,	  there	  could	  be	  many	  other	  cases	  where	  they	  do	  the	  same.	  While	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  B.W.	  Pelham,	  M.C.	  Mirenberg,	  and	  J.T.	  Jones,	  “Why	  Susie	  Sells	  Seashells	  by	  the	  Seashore:	  Implicit	  Egotism	  and	  Major	  Life	  Decisions”,	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology,	  82	  (4),	  469-­‐487.	  4	  That	  is:	  of	  the	  33,412	  women	  in	  the	  dataset,	  12,991	  moved	  to	  states	  whose	  names	  resembled	  their	  own,	  but	  10,999	  of	  these	  would	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  move	  to	  those	  name-­‐resembling	  states	  anyway;	  thus	  name	  resemblance	  made	  a	  difference	  in	  an	  estimated	  6%	  of	  cases.	  (Again,	  the	  unrepresentative	  dataset	  explains	  why	  the	  overall	  proportion	  of	  women	  moving	  to	  name-­‐resembling	  states	  is	  so	  high.)	  For	  these	  numbers,	  see	  Pelham	  et	  al.,	  Table	  6	  (p.	  475).	  Thanks	  to	  Sam	  Sims	  for	  this	  analysis.	  
sensory	  illusion	  may	  be	  small,	  [3’]	  the	  aggregate	  effect	  may	  be	  quite	  potent;	  for	  all	  one	  knows,	  any	  sensory	  experience	  may	  be	  infested	  by	  any	  number	  of	  illusory	  factors.	  This	  train	  of	  reasoning	  appears	  cogent,	  but	  even	  Descartes’	  skeptical	  meditator	  denied	  that	  it	  warranted	  any	  general	  mistrust	  of	  the	  senses:	  noticing	  the	  particular	  cases	  where	  the	  senses	  mislead	  us,	  such	  as	  when	  things	  ‘are	  hardly	  perceptible,	  or	  very	  far	  away’,	  should	  not	  lead	  us	  to	  question	  the	  ‘many	  others	  to	  be	  met	  with	  as	  to	  which	  we	  cannot	  reasonably	  have	  any	  doubt’,	  at	  least	  not	  just	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  everyday	  sensory	  inaccuracies.	  Yet	  Doris	  means	  for	  his	  skepticism	  to	  be	  different	  from	  the	  fantastical	  ‘evil	  demon’-­‐based	  stuff	  that	  the	  Cartesian	  skeptic	  ultimately	  settles	  on:	  his	  skeptical	  hypothesis	  is,	  he	  writes,	  ‘not	  a	  loopy	  (and	  perhaps	  massively	  unlikely)	  proposition	  like	  skeptical	  propositions	  involving	  Demons,	  Matrices,	  or	  envatted	  brains.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  “live”	  hypothesis	  …	  vetted	  by	  the	  relevant	  experts,	  and	  judged	  by	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  them	  to	  be	  about	  as	  likely	  as	  competing	  hypotheses’	  (TOS,	  p.	  66).	  	   But	  what	  has	  been	  expertly	  vetted,	  and	  judged	  likely,	  is	  not	  the	  likely	  widespread	  existence	  of	  cases	  where	  the	  aggregate	  effects	  of	  unconscious	  processing	  swamp	  those	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  deliberation,	  but	  only	  the	  (probably)	  widespread	  existence	  of	  unconscious	  influences	  on	  thought	  and	  behavior	  which,	  though	  philosophically	  very	  interesting	  (as	  are	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  inaccuracy),	  do	  not	  individually	  come	  anywhere	  close	  to	  canceling	  the	  force	  of	  deliberation.	  To	  conclude	  that	  since	  we	  know	  from	  experiment	  that	  these	  phenomena	  are	  likely	  prevalent,	  therefore	  they	  could	  be	  everywhere,	  and	  moreover	  occur	  in	  such	  concentration	  and	  with	  such	  unidirectional	  force	  that	  we	  are	  never	  agents	  at	  all,	  would	  be	  like	  claiming	  that	  the	  sensory	  inaccuracies	  revealed	  by	  the	  science	  of	  perception	  could	  be	  the	  rule	  rather	  than	  the	  exception,	  and	  aggregate	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  we	  never	  truly	  perceive	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  The	  latter	  argument	  can	  be	  met	  in	  a	  Moorean	  fashion:	  the	  skeptical	  hypothesis	  is	  loopy,	  not	  live,	  because	  I	  can	  see	  quite	  clearly	  that	  this	  is	  a	  hand.	  And	  the	  reflectivist	  can	  respond	  to	  Doris’s	  argument	  in	  the	  same	  way:	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  everyday	  cases	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  agents,	  and	  that	  our	  self-­‐conscious	  deliberation	  guides	  our	  thought	  and	  behavior.	  That	  our	  behavior	  in	  these	  cases	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  something	  other	  than	  deliberation,	  and	  our	  perception	  not	  always	  perfectly	  accurate,	  does	  not	  even	  tend	  to	  show	  that	  we	  are	  not	  usually	  self-­‐knowing	  agents	  and	  world-­‐knowing	  perceivers.	  	   The	  point	  of	  this	  criticism	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  extra-­‐agential	  influences	  on	  our	  choices	  can	  have	  a	  cumulative	  impact	  that	  makes	  them	  morally,	  psychologically,	  and	  politically	  very	  important.	  The	  question	  is	  where	  that	  cumulative	  impact	  lies.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  recent	  paper	  the	  social	  psychologists	  Anthony	  Greenwald,	  Mahzarin	  Banaji,	  and	  Brian	  Nosek	  address	  criticisms	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  ‘Implicit	  Association	  Task’	  (IAT),	  a	  widely	  used	  measure	  of	  implicit	  stereotypes,	  to	  predict	  discriminatory	  behavior.5	  Their	  reply	  emphasizes	  that	  it	  is	  ‘system-­‐level’	  patterns	  of	  discrimination,	  not	  individual	  choices,	  of	  which	  the	  IAT	  is	  a	  useful	  predictor:	  while	  using	  this	  measure	  to	  predict	  biased	  choices	  by	  a	  given	  person	  would	  ‘risk	  undesirably	  high	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A.G.	  Greenwald,	  M.R.	  Banaji,	  and	  B.A.	  Nosek,	  “Statistically	  Small	  Effects	  of	  the	  Implicit	  Association	  Test	  Can	  Have	  Societally	  Large	  Effects”,	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology,	  108	  (4),	  553-­‐561,	  at	  pp.	  557-­‐558.	  
rates	  of	  erroneous	  classifications’,	  these	  worries	  ‘diminish	  substantially	  as	  sample	  size	  increases’,	  e.g.	  when	  the	  concern	  is	  with	  correlations	  that	  emerge	  through	  the	  aggregate	  decisions	  of	  larger	  populations	  of	  similarly	  biased	  individuals.	  Thus	  one	  may	  accept	  the	  reality	  of	  implicit	  bias,	  and	  agree	  with	  Doris	  that	  its	  effects	  are	  ‘practically	  and	  theoretically	  large’	  (TOS,	  p.	  63),	  while	  still	  holding	  that	  our	  specific	  decisions	  of	  e.g.	  whom	  to	  hire,	  arrest,	  convict,	  etc.	  are	  largely	  responsive	  to	  reason-­‐giving	  factors	  that	  are	  present	  to	  consciousness,	  and	  thus	  that	  even	  our	  biased	  choices	  will	  count	  as	  expressions	  of	  agency	  according	  to	  the	  reflectivist	  standard.	  	   What	  is	  especially	  frustrating	  here	  is	  that	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  our	  self-­‐ignorance,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  for	  theorizing	  about	  agency	  and	  practical	  reasoning,	  could	  all	  be	  discussed	  without	  the	  problematic	  skeptical	  frame	  that	  Doris	  gives	  it.	  Consider	  again	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  implicit	  racial	  prejudice	  (see	  TOS,	  pp.	  56-­‐58).	  That	  e.g.	  decisions	  about	  whom	  to	  hire	  appear	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  how	  ‘African-­‐American-­‐sounding’	  a	  candidate’s	  name	  is,	  reveals	  how	  things	  can	  go	  terribly	  wrong	  in	  deliberation	  about	  an	  important	  decision,	  with	  significant	  costs	  to	  society	  when	  such	  effects	  cluster	  around	  widespread	  norms	  that	  are	  reinforced	  by	  discriminatory	  social	  structures.	  But	  these	  effects	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  any	  individual	  person	  whose	  hiring	  decision	  is	  influenced	  by	  implicit	  prejudice	  is	  therefore	  not	  an	  agent	  in	  that	  decision,	  or	  that	  this	  decision	  does	  not	  largely	  reflect	  her	  self-­‐conscious	  assessment	  of	  the	  candidates’	  qualifications.	  (As	  with	  the	  ‘name	  effect’,	  most	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  hiring	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  evaluator’s	  assessment	  of	  a	  candidate,	  with	  unconscious	  bias	  tipping	  the	  scales	  in	  cases	  where	  those	  qualifications	  are	  indecisive.)	  What	  they	  do	  suggest	  is	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  prejudice	  can	  impair	  our	  rationality,	  and	  make	  our	  decisions	  worse	  than	  they	  could	  be,	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  significant	  injustice	  to	  individual	  persons	  and	  larger	  social	  groups.	  That	  is	  something	  for	  philosophers	  to	  take	  very	  seriously	  even	  if	  it	  really	  is	  not,	  as	  Doris	  suggests,	  ‘surprising	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  practical	  rationality	  and	  ethical	  theory’	  (TOC,	  p.	  59)	  –	  for	  after	  all,	  even	  paradigmatically	  rationalist	  and	  reflectivist	  philosophers	  like	  Plato,	  Augustine,	  Descartes,	  and	  Kant	  all	  emphasized	  how	  often	  reason	  fails	  to	  act	  as	  our	  guide.	  It	  can	  be	  fair	  to	  criticize	  philosophers	  with	  noble	  conceptions	  of	  reason’s	  proper	  role	  in	  thought	  and	  action	  for	  failing	  to	  grapple	  sufficiently	  with	  these	  very	  important	  phenomena.	  But	  that	  grappling	  should	  not	  have	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  fending	  off	  an	  imaginary	  skeptical	  threat.	  	   What	  Doris	  describes	  in	  his	  opening	  chapter	  as	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  
psyche	  that	  was	  the	  story	  of	  20th-­‐century	  psychology,	  like	  the	  demonstration	  of	  heuristic	  irrationalities	  that	  Cassam	  discusses,	  is	  not	  really	  a	  new	  story	  at	  all:	  versions	  of	  it	  were	  told	  before	  in	  Plato’s	  account	  of	  the	  divided	  soul,	  Augustine’s	  confession	  of	  weakness	  and	  self-­‐deception,	  and	  the	  ‘lassitude’	  of	  Descartes’	  meditator	  as	  he	  lapsed	  from	  his	  philosophical	  conclusions	  back	  into	  the	  opinions	  of	  ordinary	  life.	  That	  story	  is	  told	  as	  well	  in	  the	  works	  of	  the	  great	  poets,	  playwrights,	  and	  novelists,	  Austen	  and	  Eliot	  chief	  among	  them,	  who	  all	  saw	  how	  often	  the	  things	  we	  say	  to	  ourselves	  are	  just	  attempts	  to	  obscure	  our	  true	  motives	  and	  thereby	  see	  ourselves	  as	  noble.	  As	  Cassam	  and	  Doris	  emphasize,	  these	  tendencies	  are	  most	  common,	  and	  their	  effects	  most	  powerful,	  when	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  reflection	  are	  characteristics	  of	  ourselves	  that	  we	  regard	  as	  ethically	  weighty:	  this	  makes	  it	  especially	  challenging	  for	  us	  to	  manage	  in	  these	  value-­‐laden	  self-­‐assessments	  to	  see	  
ourselves	  as	  we	  really	  are.	  (Once	  again,	  this	  is	  a	  main	  theme	  in	  Moran’s	  work	  too.)	  What	  social	  psychology	  does	  is	  operationalize	  these	  tendencies,	  giving	  us	  a	  way	  to	  measure	  them	  under	  controlled	  conditions.	  If	  this	  helps	  empirically	  minded	  philosophers	  to	  take	  the	  unconscious	  more	  seriously,	  and	  steer	  us	  away	  from	  sanitized	  and	  simplistic	  depictions	  of	  a	  self	  transparent	  to	  itself,	  philosophical	  theorizing	  will	  benefit	  from	  this	  development.	  It	  is	  good	  to	  have	  these	  books	  invite	  us	  to	  that	  task.6	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